III. The Political Theory of Dorothy Day
Dorothy Day's life, in dedication to, and commentary upon the labor movement and the rights of workers, can be best understood as critical constituent parts of her political theory. In turn, her political theory was largely implicit, assuming the reader chooses to situate political theory classically, in, for instance, Platonic or Aristotelian terms. Nevertheless, as fundamentally as any great classical political theorist, Dorothy Day concentrated on the twin primacies of the dignity of the individual and the importance of the community. She was not an abstract theoretician, but rather a pragmatist; an applied theoretician. Most importantly, she "practiced what she preached" and truly lived by her principles.
The dignity of meaningful work, especially through the mediating device of the organized labor union, is a very important unifying thread between the individual and the responsible community. Dignified work contributes significantly to fundamental human dignity, and the absence of such work can significantly retard progress toward the establishment of that dignity. 311 The key operatives in Dorothy Day's political theory are the philosophy of personalism, which stresses the centrality of the individual, and the social organizing principle of subsidiarity, which emphasizes the important constituent components of the local community as the primary locus for political organization. 312 Each merits significant attention in order to identify and fully appreciate Dorothy Day's transformative lessons for labor.
Preeminence in the philosophy of personalism is placed upon the dignity of the individual person, who is considered the socially aware conscious of the community. 313 Personalism can be very complex and intellectually intricate; it can also be very simple. Perhaps the best definition of the philosophy of personalism is that set forth in the annual mission statement of the Catholic Worker:
Personalism, a philosophy which regards the freedom and dignity of each person as the basis, focus and goal of all metaphysics and morals. In following such wisdom, we move away from a self-centered individualism toward the good of the other. This is to be done by taking personal responsibility for changing conditions, rather than looking to the state or other institutions to provide impersonal "charity. . . ." 314
The philosophy of personalism is at the center of Catholic social teaching. 315 Personalism holds that human beings are created in the likeness of God and are endowed by God with a soul, an intellect, and a rational free will. 316 As the creatures of God, made in God's image and possessing these innate spiritual attributes, humans cannot be regarded merely as a means to a goal or reified as mere objects. Rather, every human being must be treated as a subject in and of himself. The philosophy of personalism thus affirms two basic human needs: the material physical need, and the need for dignified work. Addressing these necessities is a central requirement of a properly functioning social order. Humans are unique and alike, solitary and communal, autonomous and dependent, self-centered and other-centered, self-made and culture-bound. 317 These characteristics reflect the presence of both individuality and social cognizance. 318 The worker thus possesses the need to both belong to a social community within the workplace and strive for self-expression within it; a model achieved by the formation of social groups at one's place of work and individual contribution to those groups. Through the philosophy of personalism, "[w]ork affords a person[,] as an individual[,] an opportunity to produce a good or service by contributing skills and talents that are uniquely his/hers." 319 This aids a person to realize his or her potential. 320
In personalism, the individual is called to liberation and may only achieve it by conferring to others the freedom he or she seeks for him or herself. 321 The central affirmation of personalism is a creative and free population. Freedom, in the context of this discussion, has multiple definitions. It is achieved not only by establishing the dignity of the person alone. Thus, personalism also calls every individual to fight injustice, wherever it is found and whatever the consequences. 322 These are the central insights of Emmanuel Mounier, the leading philosopher of personalism. 323 During the 1930s and 1940s, he popularized this philosophy through his journal, L'Esprit. 324 Mounier especially pointed to, "the opposition, tensions, conflicts and dilemmas which make up and are in the process of destroying contemporary civilization." 325 Personalism revolves around the notion of the human person—as "spiritual, free and rational." 326 This ideal allows each individual a new vision, allowing him to escape whatever destructiveness of civilization he may experience. 327 Personalism strives "to affirm the existing unities between thought and action, person and community, [and] community and historical situations." 328
The key goal of personalism is the "advance[ment] of the world of persons . . . [by] the communication of consciousness." 329 Such a link fosters prophetic action, the optimal form of all action. 330 According to Mounier, three fundamental insights are needed to be comprehended by an individual in order for him to gain new consciousness. First, "man alone of the animals lives amidst and within significance." 331 Second, "man must admit how reality eludes and overwhelms his analyses, judgments, and systems." 332 Finally, "all objects of man's knowledge are not exclusively reducible to their causes and effects." 333
In the ominous 1930s and 40s, Mounier saw personalism as the viable alternative to the ideologies of the day. 334 Various events of the early twentieth century resulted in the polarization of the world into three camps; one communist, one capitalist and one fascist. 335 Marxist-Leninist communism, 336 which was unconcerned with developing individual personality and consciousness, disavowed religion. 337 This disavowal of religion meant the potential elimination of God from any attempt at the development of that human consciousness. Western capitalism, 338 however, did promote the material element of individualism. 339 Mounier found this element undermined the spiritual rehabilitation of the community 340 and served to foster a greed, which threatened to deprive a substantial portion of the community of basic life necessities. Fascism 341 was a complete contrast to the subjective, centrist theory of personalism, as it held the desires of the state far more important than those of the individual. 342
In essence, "[p]ersonalism represented Mounier's response to what he believed to be the needs of mankind" during that time period. 343 His was a philosophy of reformation. 344 The "primacy of the person" is at the center of personalism because "no other person . . . no collective whole, no organism, can utilize the person as an end." 345 The second main principle of personalism is the notion of the community as family. 346 In the same way one spouse needs another or a child needs its parent, the individual needs those around him to help aid in the fulfillment of his own needs. 347 Personalism through such notions of community support, was envisioned as the "[spiritual] guide [in] building a new human order . . . a new humanism." 348
Personalism is an integrated and holistic philosophy that respects the individual and pays full attention to the physical and moral dimensions of the human character. 349 It is not, however, merely an abstract philosophy. The most important aspect is the practical way of thinking and of living which it espouses. After World War II, personalism was especially recognized for its association with French worker priests of the Roman Catholic Church, whose political activism had been directly involved in their working lives. 350 Personalism was also recognized during that period through the work of Dorothy Day and the Catholic Workers, who directly applied their philosophy in their newspaper, houses of hospitality, and job training schools. 351 The philosophy of personalism, therefore, has both a very sophisticated, abstract quality and a very tangible, real, and immediate praxis. Part of this custom is a social imperative that translates into direct and rapid social action. 352
Were it not for Peter Maurin, personalism may have remained solely in the realm of the conceptual. The major philosophical components of personalism were already present in the sophisticated thinking of philosophers such as Gabriel Marcel, 353 and Kierkegaard. 354 Peter Maurin, the French peasant philosopher and Dorothy Day's mentor, translated the philosophy of personalism into action through urging agrarian manual labor. 355 Personalism, through the practice and example of Peter Maurin, appealed to the ineffable romantic nature of many Americans, especially those already a part of the country's farming community. 356 Thomas Jefferson preceded Maurin as a great champion of agrarian personalism in the United States and he enthusiastically assigned the primary position in the social order of his new country to the agrarian citizen farmer. 357 " 'Those who labor in the earth,' wrote Thomas Jefferson in 1783, 'are the chosen people of God, if ever He had a chosen people, whose breasts He has made His peculiar deposit for substantial and genuine virtue."' 358
Personalism is closely related to the social organization principle of subsidiarity. 359 Subsidiarity emphasizes that local, community-centered organizations are the most efficacious, most conducive, and most responsive associations in existence for the fulfillment of social needs. 360 It is to the principle of subsidiarity that we now turn.
The principle of subsidiarity, simply stated, holds that political and social activity should be reduced to the most immediate and local context possible. 361 This tenet was at the root of Dorothy Day's vision of political action and continues to vitalize the Catholic Workers' mission statement:
We advocate. . . [a] decentralized society in contrast to the present bigness of government, industry, education, health care and agriculture. We encourage efforts such as family farms, rural and urban land trusts, worker ownership and management of small factories, homesteading projects, food, housing and other cooperatives—any effort in which money can once more become merely a medium of exchange, and human beings are no longer commodities. 362
Subsidiarity is powerfully situated in Catholic social theory, possessing political roots many centuries old. At its core, it champions both social cooperation and responsible self-determination. For instance, Catholic social theory regarding activism focuses on individual self-help via the merger of labor union, cooperative and employee association activity with supplementary social legislation. 363 Some commentators situate the source of the principle in Catholic social thought of the mid-nineteenth century, when it was articulated in response to massive urban poverty and social dislocation, which were prevalent conditions during the Industrial Revolution. 364 The principle of subsidiarity was integral to the first modern papal encyclical on the rights of workers, Rerum Novarum, 365 which was promulgated in 1891, and has been incorporated into every papal encyclical on social issues since. 366 Subsidiarity was most expressly articulated by Pope Pius XI in the papal encyclical of 1931, Quadregesimo Anno, 367 which was issued to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum. 368 Still, that most weighty principle, which cannot be set aside or changed, remains fixed and unshaken in social philosophy:
[I]t is an injustice, a grave evil and a disturbance of right order for a larger and higher organization to arrogate to itself functions which can be performed efficiently by smaller and lower bodies. . . . Of its very nature the true aim of all social activity should be to help individual members of the social body, but never to destroy or absorb them. 369
Prior to this statement, the Pope stated, "[I]t is wrong to withdraw from the individual and commit to the community at large what private enterprise and industry can accomplish . . . ." 370
As delineated in the law review article, Subsidiarity in the Church: The State of the Question, 371 there are nine major elements to the principle of subsidiarity. 372
Closely related to the philosophy of personalism, the principle of subsidiarity emphasizes individual free will and the primacy of the human being. It recognizes that "the state should intervene and provide help (subsidium) for only that portion of need that the private sector is unable to provision by itself." 374 This dynamic, therefore, places effective decision-making control in the hands of each individual, and reaffirms basic democratic principles. Further, it transforms the attainment of human needs from an exclusively individual concern to one of an entire society, placing a responsibility on the larger social community only where human needs cannot be met through individual aspiration alone.
Subsidiarity can be a double-edged sword. There are obvious advantages flowing from subsidiarity in action. "[I]t allows considerable individual freedom of choice, and . . . encourages personal responsibility," thus influencing each individual to fulfill his or her own needs, a result which generates "powerful incentive[s] to produce" within that person. 375 One must recognize, however, that personal freedom also has distinct disadvantages. Unchecked, individuals may use their resources imprudently, "satisfy[ing] whims, fads, fancies, and fashion[s] and to feed obsessions and addictions, at the expense of meeting needs and dependencies." 376 Therefore, the possibility exists that "the strong will use the state not to help the weak but to enhance their own [social, political and] economic standing." 377
The market economy allows us to satisfy those wants and needs while simultaneously maintaining the greatest possible freedom for us. It requires us to choose among all of our demands, all of which we are rarely able to satisfy fully. Problems are created when the state and the private sector market fail to meet physical needs, for unmet basic needs may lead to loss of personal freedom. For example, hunger destroys equality by subordinating the beggar to the provider and illiteracy destroys communication, which harms the community. 378
One may equate subsidiarity not only with personalism, but also with humanism, 379 for both see humans as "unique beings of infinite worth." 380 "Any help that is provided under subsidiarity is intended principally for the purpose of protecting and preserving the dignity of the person." 381 Without subsidiarity there cannot be authentic social economics, because "without that principle the needy who are helped are seen as instruments or threats and [are] thereby diminished as persons." 382 Therefore, as the principle asserts, "[A] larger and more powerful unit of society, such as the state, should not undertake to perform functions which can be handled as well by a smaller and weaker unit, such as the individual and his/her family, but rather should offer help where necessary to enable the weaker unit to function at full capacity." 383
Cooperation activates the various economic pressures "by means of a disposition on the part of the individual to undertake certain tasks through collective action, [which] is an important characteristic of the workplace." 384 Subsidiarity helps us determine where the responsibility lies for meeting unmet needs. The weakening significance of the workplace and the neighborhood leads to greater dependence on the state to provide for needs, but undue dependence on the state will compromise personal freedom.
Like the philosophy of personalism, principles of subsidiarity have found potentially fertile ground in both the United States and overseas. The primacy of local government, the philosophy of Thomas Jefferson, and the contemporary renaissance of states' rights, known by concepts of federalism, find many applications in American political life. 385 The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 386 demonstrates the powerful international dimension of subsidiarity. Article 3b of the Treaty provides:
The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein.In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty. 387
Just as the Tenth Amendment of the United States Constitution reserves all powers to the states, and ultimately to the people, not expressly granted to the federal government, 388 so too does the Maastricht Treaty limit the authority of the federal government and reserve the balance of all powers to the otherwise sovereign nation constituent members of the European community. Likewise, in the Treaty on European Union, tit. XVI, art. 130r, para. 2, the member states' concern for effective subsidiarity is also quite evident when it states that: "Community policy on the environment shall aim at a high level of protection taking into account the diversity of situations in the various regions of the Community." 389
On an individual level, local social groups provide the best forum for the kind of self-determination envisioned in subsidiarity theory. In his 1993 law review article, Lessons From The Social Charter: State, Corporation, and the Meaning Of Subsidiarity, 390 Professor Thomas Kohler 391 argues that subsidiarity is a pervasive organizational norm for authentic self-rule. 392 As he states, "It recommends that social institutions of all types be ordered so that decision-making can occur at the lowest capable level." 393 The state and other large institutions ought to step in only if the smaller associations cannot perform. 394 Kohler notes that the key feature of subsidiarity is "[t]he continuous and active involvement of those directly affected in an ongoing discourse about the way their lives should be ordered." 395 The overall goal of subsidiarity seems to be one which is "flexible rather than dogmatic, and emphasizes practice over programmatic versions of theoretical certainty and structural uniformity." 396 As De Tocqueville 397 put it, "individuals and societies alike become self-governing only by repeatedly and regularly engaging in acts of self-government." 398 Similar themes are replete in Pope John Paul II's encyclical Laborem Exercens, 399 which speaks of a "wide range of intermediate bodies" of "real autonomy" vis-a-vis public powers, "in honest collaboration with each other and in subordination to the demands of the common good . . . ." 400
Modern conditions have deprived many people the type of local democracy subsidiarity calls for. In his law review article The Overlooked Middle, 401 Professor Kohler proffers that the deterioration of the "middle," specifically family structure, religious organizations, grass-roots political clubs, unions, and like institutions which normally provides for us a key opportunity to teach and practice the idea of self-rule, has led to the inevitable collapse of individual autonomy. 402 What inevitably must follow is the decline of the notion of subsidiarity. 403 Kohler argues that when the human, as a social being, loses the opportunity for personal, sometimes mundane, interaction with others, he also loses his identity as a "self- constituting being." 404
Unions, which regularly utilize mediating groups to promote individual empowerment and self-determination, a goal lying at the heart of subsidiarity, 405 have recently experienced perhaps the most widespread and noteworthy deterioration of all the constituents of the middle. 406 Millions have become aware of the decline of union power, a story currently addressed by a wide range of media. 407 The population has become ambivalent toward the very idea of union association. 408 Kohler repeatedly emphasizes that the unions, because of their promotion of autonomous mediation groups, are a key component of the "middle" 409 and points out the critical role that work plays in subsidiarity by giving rise to dignity through employee associations. 410 Should the erosion of individual associations continue, the role of the state will increase in an attempt to provide for our needs and those needs may not be fully satisfied under this less efficient and more rigid statist method. 411
Like personalism, there may be no perfect way to describe the concept of subsidiarity. Professor John Hellman discusses how "no one seems to be very clear about what [personalism] is" 412 and that personalism "can be defined as a statement of concern for the human person, the human being considered in all his dimension." 413 The philosopher and personalist, Jean Lacroix, viewed personalism as an "anti-ideology." 414 "While . . . prominent personalists could do no better than to call for the affirmation of the 'absolute value of the human person,"' 415 early attempts at personalism's exact meaning were denounced from all sides of the ideological political spectrum. 416 Similarly, Kohler describes subsidiarity as being widely discussed but that different definitions are used by everyone. 417 As discussed by Kohler, author Lord Wedderburn "describe[d] subsidiarity as 'that principle of feline inscrutability and political subtlety."' 418 Labor priest George Higgins described it as emphasizing "the role of non- governmental 'mediating structures' in social and economic life." 419
After World War II, personalism, which, again, is closely related to the principles embodied in subsidiarity, had been generally associated with French worker priests, who championed the Roman Catholic Church's recent adoption of "new leftist activism." 420 George Higgins, the great "labor priest" of the United States, who studied their work, perhaps best summarizes the complexities and simplicities of subsidiarity and personalism by reference to the "correlative principle of socialization." 421 He asserts that "[t] hese principles, in tandem, are of central importance in the corpus of modern Catholic social teaching." 422 The individual, the local community, and the government are all indispensable components of one integral construct. 423 According to Higgins,
The principle of subsidiarity holds that government intervention in the economy is justified, and even necessary, when it provides help indispensable to the common good but beyond the competence of individuals or groups. It further holds that family, neighborhood, church, professional and labor groups all have a dynamic life of their own which government must respect.424
He favorably cites Pope John XXIII for bringing the concept of socialization expressly into the social encyclical Mater et Magistra. 425 Higgins, in quoting the Pope, states,
[S]ocial justice, became the most widely publicized and perhaps the most controversial part of Mater et Magistra. The pope defined socialization, a word which, to the best of my knowledge, had never before appeared in a papal document, as the "progressive multiplication of relations in society, with different forms of life and activity, and juridical institutions." It finds expression for the most part, not in government programs but in "a wide range of groups, movements, associations, and institutions . . . both within single national communities and on an international level."John XXIII embraced the phenomenon of socialization--the sum total of these organizational forces, private and public, in a participatory society. "It makes possible, in fact, the satisfaction of many personal rights, especially those of economic and social life, such as, for example, the right to the indispensable means of human maintenance, to health services, to instruction at a higher level, to a more thorough professional formation, to housing, to work, to suitable leisure, to recreation." 426
Pope John XXIII was not the last to provide insight into some of the issues adding complexity to the attainment of a proper understanding of socialization. In his papal encyclical Centesimus Annus (One Hundred Years), 427 issued to commemorate the centennial of the first great labor encyclical, Rerum Novarum (of New Things), Pope John Paul II elegantly synthesizes the delicate tensions underlying the relationship between individual and state in a participatory society: 428
[M]an, who was created for freedom, bears within himself the wound of original sin, which constantly draws him toward evil and puts him in need of redemption. Not only is this doctrine an integral part of Christian revelation, it also has great hermeneutical value insofar as it helps one to understand human reality. Man tends toward good, but he is also capable of evil. He can transcend his immediate interest and still remain bound to it. The social order will be all the more stable, the more it takes this fact into account and does not place in opposition personal interest and the interests of society as a whole, but rather seeks ways to bring them into fruitful harmony. In fact, where self-interest is violently suppressed, it is replaced by a burdensome system of bureaucratic control which dries up the wellsprings of initiative and creativity. 429
Pope John Paul II especially integrates the appropriate supplementary role of the economic state in the coordinating contexts of subsidiarity and socialization.
It is the task of the state to provide for the defense and preservation of common goods such as the natural and human environments, which cannot be safeguarded simply by market forces. Just as in the time of primitive capitalism the state had the duty of defending the basic rights of workers, so now, with the new capitalism, the state and all of society have the duty of defending those collective goods which, among others, constitute the essential framework for the legitimate pursuit of personal goals on the part of each individual. 430. . . .
Another task of the state is that of overseeing and directing the exercise of human rights in the economic sector. However, primary responsibility in this area belongs not to the state, but to individuals and to the various groups and associations which make up society. The state could not directly ensure the right to work for all its citizens unless it controlled every aspect of economic life and restricted the free initiative of individuals. This does not mean, however, that the state has no competence in this domain, as was claimed by those who argued against any rules in the economic sphere. Rather, the state has a duty to sustain business activities by creating conditions which will ensure job opportunities, by stimulating those activities where they are lacking or by supporting them in moments of crisis. 431
Personalism and subsidiarity both focus on the dignity of the individual person. 432 Both point to the fulfillment of human needs and wants as their main goal. 433 While personalism focuses on individual activism, subsidiarity calls for as many decisions as possible to be decided on the smallest 434 level possible, which may not necessarily be the individual level. State involvement is not shunned by subsidiarity, as is the case for personalism, but is instead seen to play almost a necessary role, albeit a limited one. 435 Where personalism seems to reject any form of communalism and materialism, in favor of individual spiritual vision as a means to reshape the community, 436 subsidiarity requires some variety of mid-level organization, whether it be a public association, union, fraternal club, or simply daily interaction among humans, in order to allow us to develop our abilities to directly control our lives and the world around us. 437 Materialism is seen by subsidiarity as both a necessary and unavoidable product of this great strive for individual freedom. While personalism seeks to imbue man with freedom, it declines to accept materialism and does not tolerate well its potential side-effect: greed. Personalism's rejection of material want provided hope in Europe during the Great Depression, where so many were forced to find a silver lining in the midst of their poverty.
Personalism and subsidiarity are two adjacent limbs on the tree representing the activities and messages of Dorothy Day. Their intentional renewal and nurturing of public relationships of mutual respect and accountability across the divisions of a pluralistic, atomized society—whether via labor unions or the broader plane of working peoples' associations—make Day's theory, practice, and Catholic social teaching extraordinarily relevant today. 438
NOTES
311. The fundamental goal of public policy is the enhancement of human dignity. See generally Harold D. Lasswell & Myres S. McDougal, Jurisprudence for a Free Society: Studies in Law, Science and Policy (1992). This is the core insight of the Yale policy sciences jurisprudence, founded by Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell more than fifty years ago. See generally id. For discussion of hominocentric politics, see Harold D. Lasswell & Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry XXIV (1950).
312. See William D. Miller, Dorothy Day: A Biography 244-45 (1982).
313. See Edward J. O'Boyle, Homo Socio-Economicus: Foundational to Social Economics and the Social Economy, 52 Rev. Soc. Econ. 292 (1994).
314. Voices from the Catholic Worker 578 (Rosalie Riegle Troester ed., 1993).
315. See Mel Piehl, Breaking Bread: The Catholic Worker and the Origins of Catholic Radicalism in America 63 (1982).
316. See id. at 70; see also William D. Miller, A Harsh and Dreadful Love: Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement 6 (1973). In order for man to bring about change in the world he had to "put on Christ." Id.
317. See Edward J. O'Boyle, Homo Socio-Economicus: Fundamental to Social Economics and the Social Economy, 52 Rev. Soc. Econ. 292, 299 (1994).
318. See id.
319. Id. at 299-300.
320. See id. at 300 ("[Work allows] an individual to contribute in some unique way to the production of some good[s] or service[s].").
321. See William D. Miller, A Harsh and Dreadful Love: Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement 5-6 (1982).
322. See Piehl, supra note 315, at 69. Emmanuel Mounier, founder of L'Espirit called personalism "the philosophy of action." Id.
323. See generally Joseph Amato, Mounier and Maritain: A French Catholic Understanding of the Modern World 10-13 (analyzing the life and philosophy of Emmanuel Mounier).
324. See id. at 10-12.
325. Id. at 3.
326. Id.
327. See generally id. (describing the opposition inherent in contemporary society and how human beings need to form a new vision to combat the ensuing tension and destruction).
328. Id. at 13.
329. Id. at 22.
330. See generally id. at 13 (explaining that the spirit action of the individual will allow him to transcend the destructive force of society).
331. Id. at 87.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. See generally id. at 125-47 (discussing the political atmosphere and crisis occurring in the 1930s and 40s which signalled disenchantment with civilization).
335. See generally id.
336. Communism has been defined as "[a] theoretical economic system characterized by the collective ownership of property and by the organization of labor for the common advantage of all members." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 383 (3d ed. 1992).
337. See David M. Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing" in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of Foreign Intervention, 27 Cornell Int'l L.J. 203, 218 (1994).
338. Capitalism has been defined as "[a]n economic system in which the means of production and distribution are privately or corporately owned and development is proportionate to the accumulation and reinvestment of profits gained in a free market." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 284 (3d ed. 1992).
339. Individualism has been defined as "[a] belief in the primacy importance of the individual and in the virtues of self-reliance and personal independence." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 920 (3d ed. 1992). Materialism has been defined as "[t]he theory or doctrine that physical well-being and worldly possessions constitute the greatest good and highest value in life." Id. at 1109. Western capitalism, unlike Marxist-Leninist communism espoused the theory of materialism through its emphasis on individualism and the desire of the individual to seek the "greatest good" for himself. See Amato, supra note 323, at 124-47.
340. See generally Amato, supra note 323, at 124-47 (discussing the political atmosphere during the period and how the atmosphere contributed to the development of the theory of personalism).
341. Fascism has been defined as "[a] system of government marked by centralization of authority under a dictator, stringent socioeconomic controls, suppression of the opposition through terror and censorship, and typically a policy of belligerent nationalism and racism." The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 663 (3d ed. 1992).
342. See Joseph Amato, Mounier and Martain: A French Catholic Understanding of the Modern World 125 (1975).
343. Id. at 124.
344. See id. at 125.
345. Id. at 134.
346. See id. at 134.
347. See id. at 134-35.
348. Id. at 134.
349. See id. at 124-47 (discussing Mounier's theory of personalism and how it was shaped by the competing idealogies of the 1930s).
350. See generally John Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the New Catholic Left 1930-1950 174-82 (1981) (discussing the school established by the French in the 1940s at Uriage).
351. See Mel Piehl, Breaking Bread: The Catholic Worker and the Origin of Catholic Radicalism in America 168-80 (1982) (discussing the activity of Dorothy Day and the Catholic Workers after the end of World War II).
352. See generally id. at 4 (providing an additional discussions of the philosophy of personalism, especially as it influenced Peter Maurin in the Catholic Worker); Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Towards a Personalist Jurisprudence: Basic Insights and Concepts, 28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 547 (1994) (discussing personalism and the concept of the common good through the philosophies of various theorists of personalism); Martha Bernstein, Uriage: The French Revolution That Still Endures, Montreal Gazette, July 17, 1993, at I3 (reviewing John Hellman, The Knight--Monks of Vichy France: Uriage, 1940-1945 (1993)).
353. Gabriel Marcel (1889-1973) has been deemed the first French existentialist philosopher. He believed in a world that looked past the material and embraced the spiritual. His main theory, called "participation," dealt with the interaction of human beings in society. 7 The New Encyclopedia Britannica 820-21 (1994); see also Joseph Amato, Mounier and Maritain: A French Catholic Understanding of the Modern World 112 (1975) (discussing the influence of Marcel upon the theory of personalism).
354. Soren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) was a philosopher of religion. He is famous as the originator of the philosophy known as existentialism. Existentialism, as espoused by Kierkegaard, is rooted in the belief that human beings exercise free will and that they must exercise individual choice in their lives. See 6 The New Encyclopedia Britannica 854-56 (1994); Joseph Amato, Mounier and Maritain: A French Catholic Understanding of the Modern World 106 (1975) (discussing the influence of Kierkegaard upon the theory of personalism).
355. See William D. Miller, A Harsh and Dreadful Love: Dorothy Day and the Catholic Worker Movement 100 (1973).
356. See Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism 195 (1993).
357. See id. In discussing the emergence of the Jeffersonian Republican Party in the 1790s, in their Pulitzer prize winning book, Elkins and McKitrick describe the essays by the Jeffersonian Republicans, heralding the virtues of the agrarian citizen: "The class of citizens who provide at once their own food and their own raiment, may be viewed as the most truly independent and happy. They are more: they are the best basis of public liberty and the strongest bulwark of public safety." They are exempt from the "distresses and vice of overgrown cities," and it follows "that the greater the proportion of this class to the whole society, the more free, the more independent, and the more happy must be the society itself."
Id. at 269 (citation omitted).
358. Id. at 195.
359. See generally Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation, and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. Toronto L.J. 607, 614-21 (1993).
360. See id. at 620.
361. See Edward J. O'Boyle, Homo Socio-Economicus: Foundational to Social Economics and the Social Economy, 52 Rev. Soc. Econ. 286, 295 n.5 (1994).
There is an impressive body of scholarship on subsidiarity, both in theory and in its applications. See, e.g., George A. Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United States, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 331 (1994); Deborah Z. Cass, The Word that Saves Maastricht? The Principle of Subsidiarity and the Division of Powers Within the European Community, 29 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 1107 (1992); Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation, and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. Toronto L.J. 607 (1993); W. Gary Vause, The Subsidiarity Principle in European Union Law--American Federalism Compared, 27 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 61 (1995).
362. See Voices from the Catholic Worker 578-79 (Rosalie Riegle Troester ed., 1993).
363. See Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions as Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 279, 303-04 (1995).
364. See id. at 303.
365. See id. at 304.
366. See id.
367. See Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno, in Joseph Husslein, The Christian Social Manifesto (1931).
368. See id.
369. Id. at 304.
370. Id. In the context of the times, the Catholic Church faced the twin totalitarian specters of atheistic communism and fascism. Thus, perhaps Pope Pius XI reflected an historical European "corporativism" in his exhortations in Quadragesimo Anno. See George Higgins, Organized Labor and the Church 203 (1993).
In his corporativist design Pius XI envisaged: (1)an organized and orderly economic society, with organizations of each industry and profession and a federation of such organizations; (2) an economic society which is self-governing, subject only to the superior power of the state to intervene when the public good demands it; (3)social institutions organized to seek the common good for their members as well as for all economic society; (4)the predominance of such organizations and institutions as the primary means of putting justice into economic life; (5)the rule of the great virtues of justice and charity through the functioning of these organizations. Unfortunately, corporativism became associated to some extent with Italian, Spanish, and Portuguese forms of fascism or semi-fascism. And this led many critics, particularly on the Continent, to repudiate Quadragesimo Anno's formula for the reconstruction of the social order. That was admittedly an understandable and salutary fear.
Id.
371. Joseph A. Komonchak, Subsidiarity in the Church: The State of the Question, 48 Jurist 298 (1988).
372. Id. at 301.
373. Id. at 301-02.
374. Edward J. O'Boyle, Homo Socio-Economicus: Foundational to Social Economics and the Social Economy, 52 Rev. Soc. Econ. 286, 295 (1994).
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id.
378. See id. at 297.
379. Humanism is "an outlook or system of thought concerned with human rather than divine of supernatural matters, or with the human race (not the individual), or with mankind as responsible intellectual beings." Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary 694 (1991).
380. O'Boyle, supra note 374, at 297.
381. Id.
382. Id. at 298.
383. Id. at 295 n.5.
384. Edward J. O'Boyle, Challenges Facing Social Economics in the 21st Century: A Catholic's Perspective, 51 Rev. Soc. Econ. 426, 432 (1993).
385. For an excellent discussion on federalism see Stanley Elkins & Eric McKitrick, The Age of Federalism: The Early Republic, 1788-1800 (1993).
386. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, tit.II, art. 3b, 31 I.L.M. 247, 257-58.
387. Id.
388. U.S. Const. amend. X.
389. Treaty on European Union, supra note 386, at 285.
390. Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation, and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. Toronto L.J. 607 (1993).
391. Professor Kohler is an professor at Boston College Law School. See Thomas C. Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 229 (1993).
392. Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation, and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. Toronto L.J. 607, 615 (1993).
393. Id. at 614-15. Simply put, subsidiarity is an organizational norm: It recommends that social institutions of all types be ordered so that decision-making...[and the responsibility for acting remain] at the lowest capable level. The principle insists that the state and all other forms of community exist [exclusively] for the individual. Thus, corporate bodies should not take up what individuals can do, nor should larger groups assume what smaller associations can accomplish. Conversely, the state and other large corporate bodies have the responsibility to undertake those tasks that neither individuals nor smaller associations can perform. On this view, communities and social relationships exist to supply help (subsidium) to individuals in assuming self-responsibility. The subsidiary function of community rests not in displacing but in setting the conditions for authentic self-rule.
Id.; see Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue At Work: Unions As Seedbeds Of The Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 279, 302 (1995).
394. See Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation, and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. Toronto L.J. 607, 615 (1993).
395. Id. at 622.
396. Id. at 620.
397. Alexis De Tocqueville was a political student who came to the United States from France in 1831 to observe the definition and workings of democracy in relation to how it might replace the traditional European aristocracy. See Robert D. Heffner, Introduction to Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 9 (1956). In the book, Democracy in America, De Tocqueville gives an "unparalleled abundance of description, analysis, and prophecy" dealing with "the impact of democracy or majority rule upon the structure and dynamics of American society, upon the way Americans think and feel and act, upon the essential nature of our freedoms." Id.
398. Kohler, supra note 391, at 230.
399. Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens (1981).
400. Id. at 55.
401. Kohler, supra note 391, at 229.
402. See id. at 230. See generally Peter L. Berger, In Praise of Particularity: The Concept of Mediating Structures, 38 Rev. Pol. 399 (1976).
403. See Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation, and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. Toronto L.J. 607, 625 (1993).
404. Id. at 232.
405. See id. at 240.
406. See id. at 234-35.
407. See id. at 234.
408. See id. at 235.
409. See id. at 230.
410. Id. at 234.
411. See id.
412. John Hellman, Emmanuel Mounier and the New Catholic Left 1930-1950 3 (1981).
413. Id. at 5.
414. Id. at 4.
415. Id.
416. See id. at 6 ("The earliest articulations of personalism were violently attacked from both the Right and the Left.... The consistent, violent condemnations of personalism by French communist and Soviet observers contrasted with the approbation accorded the movement by German observers after Hitler came to power.").
417. See Thomas C. Kohler, Lessons from the Social Charter: State, Corporation, and the Meaning of Subsidiarity, 43 U. Toronto L.J. 607, 614 (1993).
418. Id.
419. George Higgins, Organized Labor and the Church: Reflections of a "Labor Priest" 201 (1993).
420. Wolfgang Saxon, Yves Congar, French Cardinal, Is Dead at 91; Vigorous Ecumenist Promoter of the Laity, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1995, at A8.
[Yves Cardinal] Congar was a driving force in the French worker-priest movement, which called on priests to be close to workers by living their lives.The Vatican disapproved of that notion, on the ground that it distracted priests from their ecclesiastical function. The Vatican held that priests risked being led into trade union affiliations and were subjected to too many secular temptations.
Id. For two years, Congar was silenced and forbidden to teach or write. See id. He later shaped the Second Vatican Council and the thinking of Pope John XXIII, and was named a Cardinal in 1994 by Pope John Paul II. See id.
421. George Higgins, Organized Labor and the Church: Reflections of a "Labor Priest" 201 (1993).
422. Id.
423. See id. at. 202.
424. Id.
425. See id. at 205; see also Pope John XXIII, Mater et Magistra, in Proclaiming Justice and Peace: Papal documents from Rerum Novarum Through Centisimus Annus 81 (Michael Walsh & Brian Davies eds., 1991).
426. Higgins, supra note 421, at 205.
427. Pope John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, in Proclaiming Justice and Peace: Papal Documents from Rerum Novarum Through Centesimus Annus 432 (Michael Walsh & Brian Davies eds., 1991).
428. See generally id.
429. Id. at 450-51.
430. Id. at 463.
431. Id. at 463-69.
432. See Thomas C. Kohler, Individualism and Communitarianism at Work, 1993 BYU L. Rev. 727 (1993).
433. See id. at 728.
434. The leading book of the "smallness" movement is E.F. Schumacher, Small Is Beautiful: Economics as if People Mattered (1973). There recently has been the reemergence of an amalgam subset of subsidiarity and personalism, in the manifestation of the desirability of "smallness." See Jenny Scott, A Big Leap in the Pursuit of Smallness, N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1995, at B5.
Their movement encompasses both ends of the political spectrum—from John McClaughry, a libertarian and former advisor to President Ronald Reagan now living in rural Vermont, to Mr. Sale, who describes himself as not an anarchist but an "anarcho-communalist." They find common ground in Mr. Schumacher's ideas about decentralization, local control and community strength.Id.
435. See Thomas C. Kohler, Civic Virtue at Work: Unions As Seedbeds of the Civic Virtues, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 279, 302 (1995).
436. See Joseph Amato, Mounier and Martain: A French Catholic Understanding of the Modern World 5 (1975).
437. See Thomas C. Kohler, The Overlooked Middle, 69 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 229, 230 (1993).
438. I am especially indebted to my friend Leo Penta for these insights.